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ABSTRACT
ATTACK VISUALIZATION FOR INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
by
Mohammad A. Rabie
Attacks detection and visualization is the process of attempting to identify instances of
network misuse by comparing current activity against the expected actions of an intruder.
Most current approaches to attack detection involve the use of rule-based expert systems to
identify indications of known attacks. However, these techniques are less successful in
identifying attacks, which vary from expected patterns. Artificial neural networks provide the
potential to identify and classify network activity based on limited, incomplete, and nonlinear
data sources. Presenting an approach to the process of Attack visualization that utilizes the
analytical strengths of neural networks, and providing the results from a preliminary analysis
of the network parameters being watched like Internet Protocol (IP) packet length, packet
traffic, IP byte traffic, IP packet rate, IP byte rate, User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet
length, UDP packet traffic, UDP byte traffic, UDP packet rate, UDP byte rate, Heart Beat
(HB) End-to-end delay, and HB Packet loss rate. Beside collected attack data, numerical
simulated data was generated using the neural network sigmoids with Matlab. The
characteristics of the obtained data showed lots of similarities with the actual collected
network data. Further work is continuing to obtain different attack data using the Opnet
simulating program.
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Because of the increasing dependence, which companies and government agencies have
on their computer networks; the importance of protecting these systems from attack is
critical. A single intrusion of a computer network can result in the loss or unauthorized
utilization or modification of large amounts of data and cause users to question the
reliability of all of the information on the network. There are numerous methods of
responding to a network intrusion, but they all require the accurate and timely
identification of the attack. This paper presents an analysis of the network data that will
make it easier determine the applicability of neural networks in the identification of
instances of external attacks against a network. The results of tests conducted on a C++
programs and on another program called Parallax. Finally, the areas of future research
that are being conducted in this area are discussed.
1.1 Overview
The timely and accurate detection of computer and network system intrusions has always
been an elusive goal for system administrators and information security researchers. The
individual creativity of attackers, the wide range of computer hardware and operating
systems, and the ever- changing nature of the overall threat to target systems have
contributed to the difficulty in effectively identifying intrusions. While the complexities
of host computers already made intrusion detection a difficult endeavor, the increasing
prevalence of distributed network-based systems and insecure networks such as the
Internet has greatly increased the need for intrusion detection [20]. There are two general
categories of attacks, which intrusion detection technologies attempt to identify -
anomaly detection and misuse detection [1,13]. Anomaly detection identifies activities
that vary from established patterns for users, or groups of users. Anomaly detection
typically involves the creation of knowledge bases that contain the profiles of the
monitored activities. The second general approach to intrusion detection is misuse.
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This technique involves the comparison of a user's activities with the known behaviors of
attackers attempting to penetrate a system [17,18]. While anomaly detection typically
utilizes threshold monitoring to indicate when a certain established metric has been
reached, misuse detection techniques frequently utilize a rule-based approach. When
applied to misuse detection, the rules become scenarios for network attacks. The intrusion
detection mechanism identifies a potential attack if a user's activities are found to be
consistent with the established rules. The use of comprehensive rules is critical in the
application of expert systems for intrusion detection it requires extensive analysis of
network parameters, in order to produce a distribution for that attack on those parameters.
Since another distribution may also be generated for the normal packets on those same
parameters, then it would be correct to assume that all other packets, which don't follow
the characteristics of the normal or attack traffic as an undefined region for that attack.
In this project I will consider two types of attacks, however, actual network data is only
available for one type of attack (UDP). In order to produce more variety of attacks which
carry different characteristics from the UDP attack packets. I used a data produced by
running neural network sigmoid coded in VC++ (hyperbolic functions).
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1.2 Network Data Parameters
Developing a data collection methodology requires an evaluation of the cost and benefit of
the data in the particular domain of study. Our goal is to evaluate the effects of certain
sampling parameters on the integrity and the cost of the resulting samples. In general a
larger sample can more closely reflect the true parent population, but each instant of
sampling imposes a cost in terms of CPU time, buffer space, and sampling interval, or
amount of calendar time one can devote to deriving a particular estimate. The sampling
frequency must therefore be weighed against the accuracy requirements and complexity of
a given object.
The twelve-hour data collections for my experiment represent a brief interval, indeed itself
a sample from the ongoing population of network traffic. For the purpose of my study I
will treat the data collected as the true parent population, and the subpopulation drawn by
our various sampling techniques as the samples. Standard statistical formulas generally
rely on estimates of parameters of the parent population for the default case where the
parent population is not known. Because the actual parameters of this parent population,
we use them rather than estimate of them. Our goal is then to assess how close each sample
is to its parent population for several key measurements. For each class, one can
implement, or approximate, any particular method via timer-based. That is, one can use
timers to trigger the selection of a packet for inclusion in a sample. Implementing this
method at a variety of granularities allows a range of sampling fractions. Furthermore one
can vary the interval over which one samples: 15 minutes, an hour, a day, etc. Since the
progress are not time-homogeneous, it is not clear that spreading the same number of
samples over a longer intervals will generate the same results.
Timer-driven sampling methods use a timer rather than a packet counter to trigger the
selection of packets to include in the sample when the timer expires, we select the next
packet to arrive. This is a necessary approximation but seemingly inconsequential. For
population with a linear trend, uniform random sampling will be more efficient than
symmetric sampling.
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With the Opnet simulating tool lots of the network parameters could be collected, but the
most significant ones that we concentrated on and will enable the neural network decide a
user behavior without changing the overall behavior are listed below in the table. UDP,
ICMP, SYN attack and other attacks shares these collected parameters which makes the
data scalable to any tools and project that might utilize it. Variables X1 through X12
represent the following network parameters:
Table 1: Collected Network Parameters
Collected Parameter List
Parameterl IP in packet length
Parameter2 IP in packet traffic
Parameter3 IP in byte traffic.
Parameter4. IP in packet rate.
Parameter5 IP in-byte rate.
Parameter6 UDP in packet length.
Parameter? UDP in packet traffic.
Parameter8 UDP in byte traffic.
Parameter9 UDP in packet rate.
Parameter10 UDP in byte rate.
Parameter 11 HB End to end delay.
Parameter12 HB Packet loss rate.
1.3 Neural Network
Most current approaches to the process of detecting intrusions utilize some form of rule-
based analysis. Rule-Based analysis relies on sets of predefined rules that are provided by
an administrator, automatically created by the system, or both. Expert systems are the
most common form of rule-based intrusion detection approaches [8, 24]. The early
intrusion detection research efforts realized the inefficiency of any approach that required a
manual review of a system audit trail. While the information necessary to identify attacks
was believed to be present within the voluminous audit data, an effective review of the
material required the use of an automated system. The use of expert system techniques in
intrusion detection mechanisms was a significant milestone in the development of effective
and practical detection-based information security systems [1, 8, 19, 21, 24, and 28]. An
expert system consists of a set of rules that encode the knowledge of a human "expert".
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These rules are used by the system to make conclusions about the security-related data
from the intrusion detection system. Expert systems permit the incorporation of an
extensive amount of human experience into a computer application that then utilizes that
knowledge to identify activities that match the defined characteristics of attack.
Unfortunately, expert systems require frequent updates to remain current. While expert
systems offer an enhanced ability to review audit data, the required updates may be
ignored or performed infrequently by the administrator. At a minimum, this leads to an
expert system with reduced capabilities. At worst, this lack of maintenance will degrade
the security of the entire system by causing the system's users to be misled into believing
that the system is secure, even as one of the key components becomes increasingly
ineffective over time. Rule-based systems suffer from an inability to detect attacks
scenarios that may occur over an extended period of time. While the individual instances
of suspicious activity may be detected by the system, they may not be reported if they
appear to occur in isolation. Intrusion scenarios in which multiple attackers operate in
concert are also difficult for these methods to detect because they do not focus on the state
transitions in an attack, but instead concentrate on the occurrence of individual elements.
Any division of an attack either over time or among several seemingly unrelated attackers
is difficult for these methods to detect. Rule-based systems also lack flexibility in the rule-
to-audit record representation. Slight variations in an attack sequence can affect the
activity-rule comparison to a degree that the intrusion is not detected by the intrusion
detection mechanism. While increasing the level of abstraction of the rule-base does
provide a partial solution to this weakness, it also reduces the granularity of the intrusion
detection device. A number of non-expert system-based approaches to intrusion detection
have been developed in the past several years [4, 5, 6, 9, 15, 25, and 26]. While many of
these have shown substantial promise, expert systems remain the most commonly accepted
approach to the detection of attacks.
An artificial neural network consists of a collection of processing elements that are highly
interconnected and transform a set of inputs to a set of desired outputs. The result of the
transformation is determined by the characteristics of the elements and the weights
associated with the interconnections among them. By modifying the connections between
the nodes the network is able to adapt to the desired outputs [9, 12]. Unlike expert systems,
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which can provide the user with a definitive answer if the characteristics, which are
reviewed exactly, match those, which have been coded in the rule base, a neural network
conducts an analysis of the information and provides a probability estimate that the data
matches the characteristics, which it has been trained to recognize. While the probability
of a match determined by a neural network can be 100%, the accuracy of its decisions
relies totally on the experience the system gains in analyzing examples of the stated
problem. The neural network gains the experience initially by training the system to
correctly identify pre- selected examples of the problem. The response of the neural
network is reviewed and the configuration of the system is refined until the neural
network's analysis of the training data reaches a satisfactory level. In addition to the initial
training period, the neural network also gains experience over time as it conducts analyses
on data related to the problem.
A limited amount of research has been conducted on the application of neural networks to
detecting computer intrusions. Artificial neural networks offer the potential to resolve a
number of the problems encountered by the other current approaches to intrusion detection.
Artificial neural networks have been proposed as alternatives to the statistical analysis
component of anomaly detection systems, [5, 6, 10, 23, and 26]. Statistical Analysis
involves statistical comparison of current events to a predetermined set of baseline criteria.
The technique is most often employed in the detection of deviations from typical behavior
and determination of the similarly of events to those which are indicative of an attack [14].
Neural networks were specifically proposed to identify the typical characteristics of system
users and identify statistically significant variations from the user's established behavior.
Artificial neural networks have also been proposed for use in the detection of computer
viruses. In [7] and [9] neural networks were proposed as statistical analysis approaches in
the detection of viruses and malicious software in computer networks. The neural network
architecture, which was selected for [9] was a self-organizing feature map, which uses a
single layer of neurons to represent knowledge from a particular domain in the form of a
geometrically organized feature map. The proposed network was designed to learn the
characteristics of normal system activity and identify statistical variations from the norm
that may be an indication of a virus.
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While there is an increasing need for a system capable of accurately identifying instances
of attacks on a network there is currently no applied alternative to rule-based intrusion
detection systems. This method has been demonstrated to be relatively effective if the
exact characteristics of the attack are known. However, network intrusions are constantly
changing because of individual approaches taken by the attackers and regular changes in
the software and hardware of the targeted systems. Because of the infinite variety of
attacks and attackers even a dedicated effort to constantly update the rule base of an expert
system can never hope to accurately identify the variety of intrusions. The constantly
changing nature of network attacks requires a flexible defensive system that is capable of
analyzing the enormous amount of network traffic in a manner, which is less structured
than rule-based systems. A neural network-based attack detection system could potentially
address many of the problems that are found in rule-based systems.
The first advantage in the utilization of a neural network in the detection of instances of
attack would be the flexibility that the network would provide. A neural network would be
capable of analyzing the data from the network, even if the data is incomplete or distorted.
Similarly, the network would possess the ability to conduct an analysis with data in a non-
linear fashion. Both of these characteristics are important in a networked environment
where the information, which is received, is subject to the random failings of the system.
Further, because some attacks may be conducted against the network in a coordinated
assault by multiple attackers, the ability to process data from a number of sources in a non-
linear fashion is especially important. The inherent speed of neural networks is another
benefit of this approach. Because the protection of computing resources requires the
timely identification of attacks, the processing speed of the neural network could enable
intrusion responses to be conducted before irreparable damage occurs to the system.
Because the output of a neural network is expressed in the form of a probability the neural
network provides a predictive capability to the detection of instances of attack. A neural
network-based attack detection system would identify the probability that a particular
event, or series of events, was indicative of an attack against the system. As the neural
network gains experience it will improve its ability to determine where these events are
likely to occur in the attack process. This information could then be used to generate a
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series of events that should occur if this is in fact an intrusion attempt. By tracking the
subsequent occurrence of these events the system would be capable of improving the
analysis of the events and possibly conducting defensive measures before the attack is
successful. However, the most important advantage of neural networks in attack detection
is the ability of the neural network to "learn" the characteristics of attacks and identify
instances that are unlike any which have been observed before by the network. A neural
network might be trained to recognize known suspicious events with a high degree of
accuracy. While this would be a very valuable ability, since attackers often emulate the
"successes" of others, the network would also gain the ability to apply this knowledge to
identify instances of attacks, which did not match the exact characteristics of previous
intrusions. The probability of an attack against the system may be estimated and a
potential threat flagged whenever the probability exceeds a specified threshold.
1.4	 Visualization Tool
Each collected data record consists of four sets of 67 numbers. One collected vector is
shown in table 2 below. Checking the similarities of the vector and trying to minimize its
parameters. Using a matlab program that utilizes the wavelet compression tools and
concentrations a 13 dimensional vector (shown in table 3) was produced while keeping the
same characteristics of the original vectors with 804 dimensions shown in table2. With the
new produced vectors I was able to use a visualization tools to study further the data
behavior and contrast the normal from the attack data.
Two tools were utilized to monitor the data behavior over the network built
Parallax
Multi-dimensional graphics tool with a two-dimensional scatter plots graphics
representation tool
Scatter3D
A tool capable of producing virtual three dimensional scatter plots
These tools are discussed extensively with screen shots in chapters 2 and 3 with screen
shots.
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Table 3: Wavelet Output of Table 2
Parameter Symbol Vector Parameter Value
X1 IP Packet Length 0.0950100
X2 IP Packet Traffic 0.0959900
X3 IP Byte Traffic 0.4325300
X4 IP Packet Rate 0.5653500
X5 IP Byte Rate 0.4568760
X6 UDP Packet Length 0.5646750
X7 UDP Packet Traffic 0.3346567
X8 UDP Byte Traffic 0.3556760
X9 UDP in-Packet Rate 0.5367600
X10 UDP Byte Rate 0.4356760
X11 HB End-to-End Delay 0.5337670






The software is based on Parallel Coordinates, which is a methodology for the
unambiguous (i.e. no loss of information) visualization of multivariate data. The discovery
of multivariate/multidimensional relations in a dataset is transformed into a 2-D pattern
recognition problem. The software's unique interface, queries, and boolean operators
enable the visual/interactive discovery of complex relations in multivariate datasets, and in
turn finding the effect these relations have on various objectives. Unexpected relations
have been discovered in datasets with many variables from which sensitivities, repetitive
patterns, other trends and salient properties are found. The visualization not only helps the
discovery process but also the presentation and explanation of the results.
2.2 	 Parallax Specification
2.2.1 Parallax Header Code
A header must be added to any parallax data file in order to facilitate the access. The
header consists of two lines where the specification of how many parameters is fed to
parallax. Also it has a data starting point indicator to indicate that from here on it will be
pure data for parallax to start scanning. Below is an example of parallax header.
nvars = n
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 ... ... ... ... x(n- 1)ids = class
undefined_data = MISSING
data =
From the top header we could see that the data file consists of n parameters where the last
one is an integer label. The undefined_data = MISSING indicates that there is no other
data from out side should be looked at. The data = is the starting point of the data.
2.2.2 Parallax Data Files
Without the header the Parallax data files look simple and easy to follow. Each data file
consists of specific number of parameters with a label positioned at the last column. There
is no limit for the number of columns in the data file beside the computer screen.
Visualizing more than 30 parameters the user can't make up the produced graphs clearly.
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Sample data file for our purpose with 12 parameters and four labels is shown in the next
page. The number of the different labels at the last column indicates the different types of
data to be manipulated.
Table 4: Sample Parallax Data Filo
2.3	 Network Traffic Analysis with Parallax Software
Figure 1 illustrates Parallax window where 13 axes is drawn with the maximum value to
the top and the minimum value to the bottom on each axe. Data get scanned from the data
files and axes are drawn accordingly with the maximum value for each parameter
positioned on the top of the specific axe and the minimum value positioned at the bottom
of the same axe for the same parameter as shown in figure 2. as a last step Parallax will
connect these point horizontally to create the records.
Figure 1: Parallax Default Window
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Figure 2:Sample One Attack Data File
Figure 2 is a representation of one type of attack data file, where the normal UDP traffic is
in blue and the UDP attack traffic in pink. The data records in a specific file could be
visualized separately as shown in figure 3 and figure 4. Figure 5 illustrates one attack
record and one normal record in the same window.
Figure 3: Isolated One Attack Record
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Figure 4: Isolated Normal Data Record
Figure 5: Attack and Normal data in same Window
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2.3.1 	 Multiple Attack Data Files
Figure 6 is a representation of multiple type of attack data file where each color represents
a different type of network attack. Each attack type could be isolated from the rest of the
data and looked at separately.
Figure 6: Multiple Attack Parallax Representation
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2.3.2	 Parallax Scatter Plots
2.3.2.1 Single Attack Scatter Plots
A comparison is made between two parameters like IP Packet Length with respect to IP
Packet Traffic in the data sets collected from the network traffic. In this data,
measurements were taken at the areas where the data concentrations lay most. Notice the
following 9 figures (figure 7 - figure 15) some parameters correlate with others in different
ways. While at the time other parameters could be totally separable. The study of the
parameters dependencies could be greatly reduced through out these scatter plots.
Figure 7: Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X2)
Figure 8:Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X3)
Figure 9: Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X7)
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Figure 10: Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X5)
Figure 11: Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X71
Figure 12: Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X8)
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Figure 13: Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X9)
Figure 14: Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X10)
Figure 15: Single Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X5)
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2.3.2.2 	 Multiple Attack Scatter Plots
The need for multiple attack visualization is crucial when one more than one attack follow
the same behaviour over the network or in the data set collected. At the same time it is very
important to observe the various parameters that are very close in behaviour. Below is a set
of scatter plots taken to represent the correlation of two parameters to the others in the
same data flow or the same data set collected the network traffic.
Figure 16: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X2)
	
_ 	 tr•tt 	 €
Figure 17: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X2 vs. X5)
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Figure 1 R! Mi.1tln1P Attack cutter plot (Y4 vs. X101
Figure 19: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X3 vs. X10)
Figure 20: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X5 vs. X10)
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Figure 21: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X6 vs. X2)
Figure 22: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X2)
Figure 23: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X2 vs. X3)
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Figure 24: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X3 vs. X10)
Figure 25: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X4 vs. X2)
Figure 26: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X5 vs. X10)
23
Figure 27: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X5 vs. X10)
Figure 28: Multiple Attack scatter plot (X1 vs. X2)
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2.4 Further Work
The preliminary results from observations give a positive indication of the potential
offered by this approach, but a significant amount of research remains before it can
function as an effective tool that give us a good understanding of the relations between the
various network parameters. A complete system will require the ability to directly receive
inputs from a network data stream and to visualize the data a three dimensional view to
study the overlapping regions of the data types which will facilitate our judgment of the
overlapping regions. The most difficult component of the analysis of network traffic by a
neural network is the ability to effectively analyze the information in the data portion of an
IP datagram. The various commands that are included in the data often provide the most
critical element in the process of determining if an attack is occurring against a network.
The most effective neural network architecture is also an issue that must be addressed. A
feed- forward neural network that used a back propagation algorithm will be the best for its
simplicity and reliability in a variety of applications. However, alternatives such as the
self- organizing feature map also possess advantages in attack detection that may promote
their use. In addition, an effective neural network-based approach to attack detection must
be highly adaptive. Most neural network architectures must be retrained if the system is to
be capable of improving its analysis in response to changes in the input patterns. Adaptive
resonance theory ([2]) and self-organizing maps ([16]) offer an increased level of
adaptability for neural networks, and these approaches are being investigated for possible
use in an intrusion detection system. Finally, regardless of the initial implementation of a
neural network-based intrusion detection system for attack detection it will be essential for
the approach to be thoroughly tested in order to gain acceptance as a viable alternative to
expert systems. Work has been conducted on taxonomies for testing intrusion detection
systems ([3, 22]) that offer a standardized method of validating new technologies. Because
of the questions that are certain to arise from the application of neural networks to





A three-dimensional scatter plot is a trivariate plot in which a comparison of 3 measures is
presented, one measure along each axis. You are then presented with a 3D cube in which
the position of the current layer is indicated and a 2D plot in which the data for that layer is
accurately represented. The 3D Scatter Plot can be animated with scatter3D giving you the
ability to compare all of the layers effectively and quickly.
3.2	 Scatter3D Specification
Equation 1: Hex to Decimal example
hex 19 = (1x16 1 ) + (9x16°) = 25
Table 5: Hex to Decimal conversion table
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Table 6: Color Coded Numbers (Red, Green, Blue) 
175,238,238 
B7093 219,112,147 











Table 8: Sample Scatter3D Input Data file
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Figure 31: Default Scatter3D Window 
Figure 32: Loading Files into Program 
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Figure 33: Assigning Network Parameters to Grid Axis 
Figure 34: Window setup for data 
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3.3	 Network Traffic Analysis with Scatter3D
3.3.1 One Attack Data Files
The single attack stream or data file will have two different integers in the last column as a
label. The Table is an integer that has a decimal value representing the color of the incident
on the scatter plot. Below ia a sample data file showing the attack and the none attack
records with a decimal coded label at the end of each record. The label is either blue for
normal data records or pink for attack data records.
Table 8: Single Attack Data for Scatter3D
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Figure 35: Single Attack data scatter plot 
Figure 36: Closer look at the attack records 
Figure 37: Closer look at the attack records 
Figure 38: Same Attack records with different background and different view 
.' . 
-. '. 
. ..... ~. , -... 




Figure 39: Parallax View in Scatter3D 
Figure 40: Two Dimensional View 
.. . . 
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3.3.2 Multiple Attack Data Files 
In this section the data files carry more information that the previous one. The data label 
has more than two values. And could grow up to the maximum colors available. 
Figure 41: Multiple Attack Data Representation 
Figure 42: Multiple Attack Data with Different view 
, ,'. '" 
,,~ ; I • 
36 
Figure 43: Rotation Showing the gaps between data types 
Figure 44: Two Dimensional Representation of the same data 
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Figure 45: Changing the Data background color 




The preliminary results from our experimental Scatter3D visualization give a positive
indication of the potential offered by this tool, but a significant amount of research remains
before it can function as a complete visualization system. A complete system will require
the ability to directly receive inputs from a network data stream. The most difficult
component of the analysis of network traffic by a neural network is the ability to
effectively analyze the information in a live data stream. The various commands that are
included in the data often provide the most critical element in the process of determining if
an attack is occurring against a network. The most effective neural network architecture is
also an issue that must be addressed. A feed- forward neural network that used a back
propagation algorithm was chosen because of its simplicity and reliability in a variety of
applications. However, alternatives such as the self- organizing feature map also possess
advantages in attack detection that may promote their use. In addition, an effective neural
network-based approach to attack detection must be highly adaptive. Most neural network
architectures must be retrained if the system is to be capable of improving its analysis in
response to changes in the input patterns, (e.g., "new" events are recognized with a
consistent probability of being an attack until the network is retrained to improve the
recognition of these events). Adaptive resonance theory ([2]) and self-organizing maps
([16]) offer an increased level of adaptability for neural networks, and these approaches are
being investigated for possible use in an intrusion detection system. Finally, regardless of
the initial implementation of a neural network-based intrusion detection system for attack
detection it will be essential for the approach to be thoroughly tested in order to gain
acceptance as a viable alternative to expert systems. Work has been conducted on
taxonomies for testing intrusion detection systems ([3, 22]) that offer a standardized
method of validating new technologies. Because of the questions that are certain to arise
from the application of neural networks to intrusion detection, the use of these
standardized methods is especially important.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
There appear to be two primary reasons why neural networks have not been applied to the
problem of attack detection in the past. The first reason relates to the training requirements
of the neural network. Because the ability of the artificial neural network to identify
indications of an intrusion is completely dependent on the accurate training of the system,
the training data and the training methods that are used are critical. The training routine
requires a very large amount of data to ensure that the results are statistically accurate. The
training of a neural network for attack detection purposes may require thousands of
individual attacks sequences, and this quantity of sensitive information is difficult to
obtain. However, the most significant disadvantage of applying neural networks to
intrusion detection is the "black box" nature of the neural network. Unlike expert systems,
which have hard-coded rules for the analysis of events, neural networks adapt their
analysis of data in response to the training, which is conducted on the network. The
connection weights and transfer functions of the various network nodes are usually frozen
after the network has achieved an acceptable level of success in the identification of
events. While the network analysis is achieving a sufficient probability of success, the
basis for this level of accuracy is not often known. The "Black Box Problem" has plagued
neural networks in a number of applications [11]. This is an on-going area of neural
network research.
There are two general implementations of neural networks in misuse detection systems.
The first involves incorporating them into existing or modified expert systems. Unlike the
previous attempts to use neural networks in anomaly detection by using them as
replacements for existing statistical analysis components, this proposal involves using the
neural network to filter the incoming data for suspicious events which may be indicative of
misuse and forward these events to the expert system. This configuration should improve
the effectiveness of the detection system by reducing the false alarm rate of the expert
system. Because the neural network will determine a probability that a particular event is
indicative of an attack, a threshold can be established where the event is forwarded to the
expert system for additional analysis. Since the expert system is only receiving data on
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events, which are viewed as suspicious, the sensitivity of the expert system can be
increased, (typically, the sensitivity of expert systems must be kept low to reduce the
incidence of false alarms). This configuration would be beneficial to organizations that
have invested in rule-based expert system technology by improving the effectiveness of the
system while it preserves the investment that has been made in existing intrusion detection
systems. The disadvantage of this approach would be that as the neural network improved
its ability to identify new attacks the expert system would have to be updated to also
recognize these as threats. If the expert system were not updated then the new attacks
identified by the neural network would increasingly be ignored by the expert system
because its rule-base would not be capable of recognizing the new threat. The second
approach would involve the neural network as a standalone misuse detection system. In
this configuration, the neural network would receive data from the network stream and
analyze the information for instances of misuse. Any instances, which are identified as
indicative of attack would be forwarded to a security administrator or used by an
automated intrusion response system. This approach would offer the benefit of speed over
the previous approach, since there would only be a single layer of analysis. In addition,
this configuration should improve in effectiveness over time as the network learns the
characteristics of attacks. Unlike the first approach, this concept would not be limited by
the analytical ability of the expert system, and as a result, it would be able to expand
beyond the limits of the expert system's rule-base.
In an effort to determine the applicability of neural networks to the problem of misuse
detection we conducted an analysis the approach utilizing simulated network traffic. The
experiment was designed to determine if indications of attack could be identified from
typical network traffic, but it was not intended to completely resolve the issue of applying
neural networks to misuse detection. The analysis did not address the potential benefit of
identifying a priority attacks that may be possible through the use of neural networks.
However, determining if a neural network was capable of identifying misuse incidents with
a reasonable degree of accuracy was considered to be the first step in applying the
technology to this form of intrusion detection.
The first prototype neural network was designed to determine if a neural network was
capable of identifying specific events that are indications of misuse. Neural networks had
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been shown to be capable of identifying TCP/IP network events in [27], but our prototype
was designed to test the distinction between various network traffic which in return will
lead to facilitate the use of neural network to identify indications of attack. The prototype
utilized a server client architecture that consisted of fully connected layers with nine input
nodes. Our prototype was designed to collect various traffic parameters described in the
previous chapters. The prototype was configured to capture the data for each event, which
would be consistent with a network frame, (e.g., source address, destination address,
packet data, etc.). In addition to the "normal" network activity that was collected as events,
the host for the monitor was "attacked" using the coded programs residing at the clients
(nodes). These applications (Opnet) were used because of their ability to generate a large
number of simulated attacks against a specified network host. Opnet were configured for a
variety of attacks, ranging from denial of service attacks to port scan. Approximately
12000 individual PDF's were collected and stored in data files of which approximately in
some cases 10000 were simulated attacks.
Three levels of preprocessing of the data were conducted to prepare the data for
visualization and then for use in the training and testing of the neural network. In the first
round of preprocessing random data records were selected from the available pdf's files.
The selected records are typically present in network data packets and they provide a
complete description of the information transmitted by the packets. Since the data records
are long a compression scheme was needed to convert the records to standard numeric
presentation. The second part of the preprocessing phrase consisted of converting data
elements (Attack type, and Raw data) into a standardized numeric representation. The
process involved the creation of matlab wavelet code.
The program computes the similarity values between two PDF's. It is assumed that the
input is of the form: 8 real numbers, with numbers 5, 6, and 7 denoting either an attack or
typical behavior (with the sum being equal to zero for typical, non-zero for attack), then
followed by 12 sets of 67, with each set being a PDF. The 67 numbers are of the form:
first is the sample size, second is the minimum value, third is the bin width (for uniform
bins), followed by 64 percentile values corresponding to the probability of each bin. The
similarity measures are computed for five different levels of wavelet computations. The
output consists of 12 similarity measures and one flag indicating either typical behavior or
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attack traffic. The output is then stored in data files for the visualization and neural
network use. The data files were used during training and testing of the neural network.
The training/testing iterations of the neural network required some time to complete. At
the conclusion of the training the following results were obtained: The figures matched
very closely with the desired. After the completion of the training and testing of the traffic
various connection weights were frozen and the network was interrogated. Three sample
patterns containing "normal" network events and a single simulated attack event were used
to test the neural network. While this prototype (visualization) was not designed to be a
complete intrusion detection system, the results clearly demonstrate the potential of a the
tools used and neural network to detect individual instances of possible attack from a




Research and development of intrusion detection systems has been ongoing since the early
1980's and the challenges faced by designers increase as the targeted systems because
more diverse and complex. Misuse detection is a particularly difficult problem because of
the extensive number of vulnerabilities in computer systems and the creativity of the
attackers. Neural networks provide a number of advantages in the detection of these
attacks. The early results of our tests of these technologies show significant promise, and
our future work will involve the refinement of this approach and the development of a full-
scale demonstration system.
The framework presented here is for the evaluation and visualizing techniques for network
traffic characterization. I have applied my methodology to twelve target metrics: IP packet
length, IP in packet traffic, IP in byte traffic, IP in packet rate, IP in byte rate, UDP in
packet length, UDP in packet traffic, UDP in byte traffic, UDP in packet rate, UDP in byte
rate, Heart Beat End to end delay, and Heart Beat Packet loss rate. My experimental data
consisted of a packet trace obtained from Opnet simulation. Because the characteristics of
our population of network data collected some experimental parameters were controlled.
Neural network sigmoid where used to evaluate the goodness of the data and to produce
more similar data. One important result is that the data collected using the neural network
sigmoid and the simulated data are compatible with the original distribution of the real
network data with consideration to the inter-arrival time and the packet size.
My methodology can be extended to and applied to characterization of network traffic that
is based on proportions, e.g., TCP/UDP port distribution. More difficult would be to
characterize the goodness of fit of the sampled source destination traffic matrix, mainly









static char THIS_ FILE[] = _FILE_ ;
#endif
/*















BEGIN_ MESSAGE MAP(CGLMouseRotate, COpenGLWnd)







// CGLMouseRotate message handlers
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// NOTE: we need a flag, can't just check whether got capture,





void CGLMouseRotate::OnLButtonUp(UINT nFlags, CPoint point)
{






void CGLMouseRotate::OnMouseMove(UINT nFlags, CPoint point)
{
II check if we are in mouse rotate






m_yMouseRotation -= (float)(m_LeftDownPos.x - point.x)/3.0f;







glRotatef(m_xMouseRotation, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0);










static char THIS _ FILE[] = FILE •
#endif
// returns the next biggest number from val set to sig significant figures
// use for top label axes
// thus 250=(247,2); 300 = (247,1)









































float yW=m MaxY-m MinY;
float zW=m MaxZ-m MinZ;
// need to scale data between -0.5 and 0.5 in all dimensions
float x,y,z,r,g,b;
// NOTE: z axis goes -ve into screen, so invert z values to make
// like normal 3D graph (z gets bigger going into screen

























































BEGIN_ MESSAGE MAP(CGLScatterGraph, CGLMouseRotate)
// {AFX MSG MAP(CGLScatterGraph)
// NOTE - the ClassWizard will add and remove mapping macros here.

















TRACE("In CGLScatterGraph::OnDrawGL, mode = %s\n",mode);
#endif
glPushMatrix();	 // this saves the modelmatrix settings
DoMouseRotate();
m_GraphBox.Draw(); // draw box from display list constructed in OnCreate
glPointSize(m_SymbolSize);
RenderData();













void CGLScatterGraph::OnSizeGL(int cx, int cy)
{









if (m_ProjType==0) // ortho












// following could also be set by calling COpenGLWnd::OnCreateGL();
// perform hidden line/surface removal (enabling Z-Buffer)
glEnable(GL DEPTH TEST);
// set background color to black
glClearColor(0.f,0.f,0.f,1.0f );
// set clear Z-Buffer value
glClearDepth(1.00;
// specific to scattergraph
MakeFont();
//	 RasterFont(); // call to instantiate font bitmaps (maybe should be in base class?)
// make a graph box, since we will need one for all time






























































































































































































































































































float endAx = 0.85;







































if (m_ProjType==0) // ortho





























if (mbAutoScaleX mbAutoScaleY mbAutoScaleZ)
{
for (i=0; i<m_Count, i++)
{



























BOOL CGLScatterGraph::PtWithinAxes(float x,float y,float z)
{
if ( x >= m MinX &&
x <= m_MaxX &&
y >= m_MinY &&
y <= m_MaxY &&
z >= m MinZ &&































END_  MESSAGE MAP()
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////































void CGLSelectableScatterGraph::OnLButtonUp(UINT nFlags, CPoint point)
{
if (mbMakeSel—TRUE && m_SelPts.GetSize()>0)
{












void CGLSelectableScatterGraph::OnMouseMove(UINT nFlags, CPoint point)
{
// m bMakeSel is set true by button click, and Capture is set
// in OnLButtonDown, which starts the drawing of the selection circle
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if (m bMakeSel && m_SelPts.GetSize()>0)// check whether had a mouse down
{
CClientDC dc( this );
dc.SelectStockObject(WHITE_PEN);
m_SelPts.Add(point);
// Draw a line from the previous detected point in the mouse













































// make a region from selPts
CPoint *pt=new CPoint[m_SelPts.GetSize()];





// get a list of coordinate using feedback mode
// don't know how to calculate how much memory needed for buffer, but
// experiment shows the drawing has 96 floats overhead, + 4 per point




























TRACE("return val from setting RenderMode = %d\n",rv);
//////////
// now find which data points have which screen coords







































m bAutoScaleX=m bAutoScaleY=m bAutoScaleZ=FALSE;




// drawCount is index of points which are drawn within old axes,
// and therefore appear in pSelList
int drawCount=-l;

































// OpenGLWnd.cpp : implementation file
//










static char THIS_ FILE[] = FILE •
#endif
#define MAX_LISTS 20
// used to identify a MCD video driver (partial OGL acceleration)









// define a default cursor
m hMouseCursor- -AfxGetApp()->LoadStandardCursor(IDC_ARROW);
// set the disp list vector to all zeros
for (int c=0;c<MAX_LISTS;c++) m_DispListVector[c]=0;
















END_  MESSAGE MAP()
II COpenGLWnd Constants
// these are used to construct an equilibrated 256 color palette
static unsigned char _threeto8[8] =
{
0, 0111»l, 0222»1, 0333»1, 0444»1, 0555»1, 0666>>l, 0377
};
static unsigned char _twoto8[4] =
{
0, 0x55, 0xaa, 0xff
};




static int defaultOverride[13] =
{
0, 3, 24, 27, 64, 67, 88, 173, 181, 236, 247, 164, 91
1;
// Windows Default Palette
static PALETTEENTRY defaultPalEntry[20] =
{
{ 0,	 0,	 0,	 0 },
{ 0x80,0, 	 0, 0 },
{ 0, 	 0x80,0, 0 },
{ 0x80,0x80,0, 0 },
{ 0, 	 0, 	 0x80, 0 },
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{ 0x80,0, 0x80, 0 },
{ 0, 0x80,0x80, 0 },
{ OxCO 3 0xCO 3 0xCO, 0 },
{ 192, 220, 192, 0 },
{ 166, 202, 240, 0 },
{ 255, 251, 240, 0 },
{ 160, 160, 164, 0 },
{ 0x80,0x80,0x80, 0 },
{ OxFF,O, 0, 0 },
{ 0, 0xFF,0, 0 },
{ 0xFF,0xFF,0, 0 },
{ 0, 0, OxFF, 0 },
{ 0xFF,0, 0xFF, 0 },
{ 0, 0xFF,0xFF, 0 },
{ 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0 }
};
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// COpenGLWnd message handlers
int COpenGLWnd::OnCreate(LPCREATESTRUCTlpCreateStruct)
{
if (CWnd::OnCreate(lpCreateStruct) == -l)
return -l;
// OpenGL rendering context creation
PIXELFORMATDESCRIPTOR pfd;
int	 n;
// initialize the private member
mpCDC= new CClientDC(this);
// choose the requested video mode
if (!bSetupPixelFormat()) return 0;
// ask the system if the video mode is supported
n=::GetPixelFormat(m_pCDC->GetSafeHdc());
::DescribePixelFormat(mpCDC->GetSafeHdc(),n,sizeof(pfd),&pfd);
// create a palette if the requested video mode has 256 colors (indexed mode)
CreateRGBPaletteO;
// link the Win Device Context with the OGL Rendering Context
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m_hRC = wglCreateContext(m_pCDC->GetSafeHdcO);
// specify the target DeviceContext (window) of the subsequent OGL calls
wglMakeCurrent(m_pCDC->GetSafeHdc(), m_hRC);
// performs default setting of rendering mode,etc..
OnCreateGLO;






// specify the target DeviceContext (window) of the subsequent OGL calls
wglMakeCurrent(mpCDC->GetSafeHdc(), mhRC);
// remove all display lists
for (int c=0;c<MAX_LISTS;c++) if(m_DispListVector[c])
glDeleteLists(m_DispListVector[c],l);
// release definitely OGL Rendering Context
if (m_hRC!=NULL) ::wglDeleteContext(m_hRC);




// destroy Win Device Context
if(m_pCDC) delete mpCDC;





// OGL has his own background erasing so tell Windows to skip
return TRUE;
}





// when called with a nonzero window:
if(0< cx &&0<cy)
{




// specify the target DeviceContext of the subsequent OGL calls
wglMakeCurrent(m_pCDC->GetSafeHdc(), mhRC);
// call the virtual sizing procedure (to be overridden by user)
OnSizeGL(cx,cy);





// NOTE this does not work if a derived class captures the mouse.
// The cursor must then be set explicitly with each Mouse call.





// pass in origin (bottom,left,near), width, height, depth
// NOTE, to make box go into screen from org, z must be negative


























// prepare a semaphore
static BOOL bBusy = FALSE;
// use the semaphore to enter this critic section
if(bBusy) return;
bBusy = TRUE;
// specify the target DeviceContext of the subsequent OGL calls


















// call the virtual drawing procedure (to be overridden by user)
OnDrawGLO;
// execute OGL commands (flush the OGL graphical pipeline)
glFinish();
// if double buffering is used it's time to swap the buffers
//	 SwapBuffers(dc.mps.hdc);
SwapBuffers(mpCDC->GetSafeHdc());
// turn the semaphore "green"
bBusy = FALSE;
// free the target DeviceContext (window)
wglMakeCurrent(NULL,NULL);
// do any GDI drawing




1/ COpenGLWnd public members
void COpenGLWnd::VideoMode(ColorsNumber &c, ZAccuracy &z, BOOL &dbuf)
{







// set the specified cursor (only if it is a valid one)
if(mcursor!=NULL) mhMouseCursor=mcursor;
}












// Derive driver information
case ACCELERATION: if( 0—(INSTALLABLE_DRIVER_TYPE_MASK &
pfd.dwFlags)) str - ='Fully Accelerated (ICD)"; // fully in hardware (fastest)
else if
(INSTALLABLE DRIVER TYPENIASK—(INSTALLABLE_DRIVER_TYPE_MASK
& pfd.dwFlags) ) str="Partially Accelerated (MCD)"; 1/ partially in hardware (pretty fast,
maybe..)
else str=" Not Accelerated (Software)"; 	 // software
break;
// get the company name responsible for this implementation
case VENDOR:str=(char*)::glGetString(GL_VENDOR);
if ( ::glGetError()!=GL__NO_ERROR) str.Format("Not Available");// failed!
break;
I/ get the renderer name; this is specific of an hardware configuration
case RENDERER:str–(char*)::g1GetString(GL3ENDERER);
if ( ::glGetError()!=GL_NO_ERROR) str.Format("Not Available");// failed!
break;
I/ get the version
case VERSION:str–(char*)::glGetString(GL__ VERSION);
if ( ::glGetError()!=GL_NO_ERROR) str.Format("Not Available"):// failed!
break;
// return a space separated list of extensions
case EXTENSIONS: str--(char'')::gIGetString(GL_EXTENSIONS);
if ( ::glGetError()!–GLNO_ERROR) str.Format("Not Available");// failed!
break:
};





check if we are already inside a drawing session
if(m hRC—wg-IGetCurrentContext() && m_pCDC-
>GetSafelit.ic()==wgiGetCurrentDCO )
{
// draw directly all display lists





I/ specify the target DeviceContext of the subsequent OGL calls
wglMakeCurrent(mpCDC->GetSafeHdc(), m_hRC);
// draw all display lists
for (int c=0;c<MAX_LISTS;c++) if(m_DispListVector[c])
glCallList(m_DispListVector[c]);






// check if we aren't inside another couple begin/end
if(!m_bInsideDispList)
{
/I search a free slot
for (int c=0,m_DispListVector[c]!=0;c++);
// check if we are inside a drawing session or not....
if(!( m_hRC==wglGetCurrentContext() && m_pCDC-
>GetSafeHdc()==wglGetCurrentDCO ))
{
...if not specify the target DeviceContext of the subsequent OGL calls
wglMakeCurrent(mpCDC->GetSafeHdc(), m_hRC);
// set a warning for EndDispList
m bExternDispListCall=TRUE;
1;
// create a handle to the disp list (actually an integer)
m_DispListVector[c]=glGenLists(l);
// set a semaphore
m bInsideDispList=TRUE;






I/ close the disp list
glEndListO;
// unset the semaphore
m_bInsideDispList=FALSE;
74





I/ check if we are referring to the right Rendering Context
if(m hRC—wglGetCurrentContext() && mpCDC-
>GetSafeHdc()==wglGetCurrentDCO )
{
// delete active display lists





// specify the target Rendering Context of the subsequent OGL calls
wglMakeCurrent(mpCDC->GetSafeHdc(), m_hRC);
// delete active display lists
for (int c=0;c<MAX LISTS;c++) if(m_DispListVector[c])
glDeleteLists(m DispListVector[c],l);






// check if we are inside a drawing session or not....
if(!( m_hRC==wglGetCurrentContext() && mpCDC-
>GetSafeHdc()==wglGetCurrentDCO ))
{
// ...if not specify the target DeviceContext of the subsequent OGL calls
wglMakeCurrent(m_pCDC->GetSafeHdc(), m_hRC);


































// save current transformation matrix
glPushMatrix();
// save current OGL internal state (lighting, shading, and such)
glPushAttrib(GL_ALL_ATTRIB_BITS);
};




// restore transformation matrix
glPopMatrix();









// set the context for GL calls (if needed)
//	 BeginGLCommands();
// check if another list is under construction
int cur;
glGetIntegerv(GL LISTINDEX,&cur);
if(cur != 0) {TRACE("Error: Nested display list definition!");ASSERT(FALSE);};
// if the list is empty firstly allocate one
if(!m_glListId) m_glListId=glGenLists(l);






II check the coupling with a preceding call to StartDef()
int cur;
glGetIntegerv(GL LIST rNDEX,&cur);
if(cur != m_glListId) {TkACE(" GLDispList:Missing StartDef() before
EndDefO\n");return;1;
// close list definition
glEndListO;








// get the initially choosen video mode
n = ::GetPixelFormat(m_pCDC->GetSafeHdc());
::DescribePixelFormat(mpCDC->GetSafeHdc(), n, sizeof(pfd), &pfd);
// if is an indexed one...
if (pfd.dwFlags & PFD_NEED_PALETTE)
{
// ... construct an equilibrated palette (3 red bits, 3 green bits, 2 blue bits)
// NOTE: this code is integrally taken from MFC example Cube
n = 1 << pfd.cColorBits;















/1 fix up the palette to include the default Windows palette
if ((pfd.cColorBits == 8) 	 &&
(pfd.cRedBits == 3) && (pfd.cRedShift == 0) &&
(pfd.cGreenBits == 3) && (pfd.cGreenShift == 3) &&
(pfd.cBlueBits == 2) && (pfd.cBlueShift == 6)
{










unsigned char COpenGLWnd::ComponentFromIndex(int i , UINT nbits, UINT shift)
unsigned char val;



















// define default desired video mode (pixel format)
static PIXELFORMATDESCRIPTOR pfd =
{
sizeof(PIXELFORMATDESCRIPTOR),	 // size of this pfd








PFD_TYPE_RGB A,	 // RGBA type
24,	 // 24-bit color depth
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,	 /1 color bits ignored
0,	 // no alpha buffer
0,	 1/ shift bit ignored
0,	 // no accumulation buffer
0, 0, 0, 0,	 // accum bits ignored
16,	 // 32-bit z-buffer
0,	 // no stencil buffer
0,	 // no auxiliary buffer
PFD_ 	 PLANE	 _ P ,	 // main layer
0,	 // reserved
0, 0, 0	 // layer masks ignored
;






if(bDoublBuf) pfd.dwFlags=PFD DRAW TO WINDOW














1/ ask the system for such video mode
ASSERT(m_pCDC != NULL);
int pixelformat;





// try to set this video mode
if (SetPixelFormat(m_pCDC->GetSafeHdc(), pixelformat, &pfd) — FALSE)
{





// neither the requested nor the default are available: fail









8 perform hidden line/surface removal (enabling Z-Buffer)
glEnable(GL_DEPTH_TEST);
/I set background color to black
glClearColor(0.f,01,0.f,l.0f );
























// blue z axis













void COpenGLWnd::OnSizeGL(int cx, int cy)
{









































SelectObject (m_pCDC->GetSafeHdc(), GetStockObject (SYSTEM_FONT));
/I create the bitmap display lists
// we're making images of glyphs 0 thru 255
// the display list numbering starts at m_FontListBase, an arbitrary choice


















































static char THIS _ FILE[] = _FILE_ ;
#endif
// CScatter3DApp
BEGIN_ MESSAGE MAP(CScatter3DApp, CWinApp)
//1 {AFX MSG MAP(CScatter3DApp)
// NOTE - the ClassWizard will add and remove mapping macros here.
// DO NOT EDIT what you see in these blocks of generated code!
//} }AFX MSG
ON COMMAND(ID_HELP, CWinApp::OnHelp)




// TODO: add construction code here,
// Place all significant initialization in InitInstance
}






// If you are not using these features and wish to reduce the size
// of your final executable, you should remove from the following
// the specific initialization routines you do not need.
#ifdef AFXDLL
Enable3dControlsO;	 // Call this when using MFC in a shared DLL
#else




int nResponse = dlg.DoModal();
if (nResponse == IDOK)
// TODO: Place code here to handle when the dialog is
// dismissed with OK
else if (nResponse == IDCANCEL)
{
// TODO: Place code here to handle when the dialog is
// dismissed with Cancel
}
// Since the dialog has been closed, return FALSE so that we exit the





























m MinX = 0.0f;
m MinY = 0.0f;
m MinZ = 0.0f;
m bAutoX = TRUE;
m bAutoY = TRUE;
m_bAutoZ = TRUE;
m_DatCount = 4;
/i} IAFX DATA INIT
// Note that Loadlcon does not require a subsequent Destroylcon in Win32
m_hIcon = AfxGetApp()->LoadIcon(IDR MAINFRAME);












DDX Control(pDX, IDC COMB02, m comboy);
DDX Control(pDX, IDC COMB03, m comboz);
DDX Radio(pDX, IDC PROJ TYPE, m_ProjType);
DDX Text(pDX, IDC SYMBOL_SIZE, m SymbolSize);
DDV_MinMaxlnt(pDX, m SymbolSize, l, 20);
DDX Check(pDX, IDC MOUSEROTATE, m_bMouseRotate);
DDX Text(pDX, IDC_MAX X, m_MaxX);
DDX Text(pDX, IDC_MAX Y, m MaxY);
DDX_Text(pDX, IDC_MAX Z, m MaxZ);
DDX_Text(pDX, IDC_MIN_X, m_MinX);
DDX_Text(pDX, IDC_MIN_Y, m MinY);
DDX_Text(pDX, IDC MIN Z, m MinZ);
DDX Check(pDX, IDC AUTO_X, m bAutoX);
DDX Check(pDX, IDC AUTO_Y, m bAutoY);
DDX Check(pDX, IDC AUTO Z, mbAutoZ);
DDX Text(pDX, IDC DAT_COUNT, m_DatCount);
//I AFX_DATA_MAP
}





ON BN CLICKED(IDC PROJ TYPE, OnProjType)
ON_BN_CLICKED(IDC_PROJ TYPE2, OnProjType2)
ON BN CLICKED(IDC_BACK_COLOUR, OnBackColour)
ON_WM DRAWITEMO
ON_ EN KILLFOCUS(IDC SYMBOL SIZE, OnKilifocusSymbolSize)
ON BN CLICKED(IDC MOUSE ROTATE, OnMouseRotate)
ON BN_CLICKED(IDC_AUTO X, OnAutoX)
ON BN_CLICKED(IDC_AUTO_Y, OnAutoY)
ON_BN CLICKED(IDC AUTO Z, OnAutoZ)
ON_ EN KILLFOCUS(IDC MAX X, OnKillfocusMaxX)
ON_ EN KILLFOCUS(IDC MAX Y, OnKillfocusMaxY)
ON_ EN KILLFOCUS(IDC MAX Z, OnKillfocusMaxZ)
ON EN KILLFOCUS(IDC_MIN X, OnKillfocusMinX)
ON EN KILLFOCUS(IDC_MIN_Y, OnKillfocusMinY)
ON_EN_KILLFOCUS(IDC_MIN_Z, OnKillfocusMinZ)
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ON BN CLICKED(IDC MAKE SEL, OnMakeSel)
ON BN CLICKED(IDC CANCEL SEL, OnCancelSel)
ON BN CLICKED(IDC ZOOM SEL, OnZoomSel)
ON BN_CLICKED(IDC_COPY, OnCopy)
ON BN CLICKED(IDC LOAD, OnLoad)
ONIWN7I-DROPFILESO
ON BN CLICKED(IDC_PT COLOUR, OnPtColour)








II Set the icon for this dialog. The framework does this automatically
// when the application's main window is not a dialog
SetIcon(m hIcon, TRUE); 	 // Set big icon
SetIcon(m_hIcon, FALSE);	 // Set small icon
// Enable drag/drop open
DragAcceptFiles();
CRect rect(10,10,10,10);
// TODO: Add extra initialization here
mpDisplay->Create( NULL, //CWnd default
NULL, //has no name
WS CHILDIWS CLIPSIBLINGSIWS CLIPCHILDRENIWS_VISIBLE,
rect,
this, //this is the parent
0); //this should really be a different
number... check resource.h










m_pDisplay->AllowMouseRotate(m_bMouseRotate);//0.5, 1., 	 0.,





















OnAutoX(); // scale data and fill edit boxes
OnAutoYO;
OnAutoZO;
return TRUE; // return TRUE unless you set the focus to a control
}
// If you add a minimize button to your dialog, you will need the code below
// to draw the icon. For MFC applications using the document/view model,





CPaintDC dc(this); // device context for painting
SendMessage(WMICONERASEBKGND, (WPARAM) dc.GetSafeHdcO,
0);
// Center icon in client rectangle
int cxIcon = GetSystemMetrics(SM_CXICON);
int cyIcon = GetSystemMetrics(SM_CYICON);
CRect rect;
GetClientRect(&rect);
int x = (rect.Width() - cxIcon + l) / 2;
int y = (rect.Height() - cyIcon + 1) / 2;




// The system calls this to obtain the cursor to display while the user drags


























// OnSize is first called before
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GetDlgItem(IDC__GRAPH_ TOPLEFT)-GetWindowRect(R); 	 // get
dimensions of Button
ScreenToClient(R);
// R.left=R.right-f- 1 0;



























void CScatter3DDlg::OnDrawltem(int nIDCtl, LPDRAWITEMSTRUCT
lpDrawItemStruct)
{
if (nIDCtl —IDCBACK_COLOUR II tiIDCtl —IDC__PT__COLOUR)


































































































lm b0 dAllowkotate-m bMouseRotate;
m bMouseRotatc-- FALSE,
UpdateData(FALSE);






















((CEdit *)GetDlgIte,m(IDC_MAX X.))->SetReadOnly(m bAutoX);
((CEdit *)GetDlg,Item(IDC_MIN Y))->SetReadOnly(m bAutoY);
((CEdit *)GetDlgItem(IDC_MAX Y))->SetReadOnly(m bAutoY);





















CATCH( CFileException, e )
{
#ifdef _DEBUG









int i = 0;
CString fName = dlg.GetFileNameO;//"demo.dat";
fp = fopen(fName, "r");
file = fName;




int Inputfilecolumns = 0;












m comboy.InsertString(i,"IP packet length");





















m comboz.InsertString(i,"IP byte rate");
break;
case 5:





m combox.InsertString(i,"UDP packet traffic");
m_comboy.InsertString(i,"UDP packet traffic");




















m_comboy.InsertStringiti,"iN E -ad-to-ert41 delay");
m_comboz InsertString(i."1- 1B End-to-end delay");
break;
case 11:
comboxinsertString(i,"HB Packet loss rate"):
m_comboy.lnsertString(i,"HB Packet loss rate");

















char line[STRLEN]; //array of chars 1000 elements
FILE *fp;
fp — fopen(fName, "r");
if (!fp)
{






// count dimensions (number of floats in line)
int dimCount=0;
BOOL bInFlt=FALSE;







if (dimCount!=3 && dimCount!=4 && dimCount!=6)
{





// find number of lines

















for (i=0; i<m_DatCount; i++)
{
for (j=0; j<3; j++)
{
if ((rv=fscanf(fp, "%f', &(m___pData[i*3+j])))!=l)
goto error;
}
if (dimCount==4)	 // COLORREF as last item
{
if ((rv=fscanf(fp, "%u", &(m_pColList[i])))!=l)
goto error;
}
else if (dimCount==6) // r,g,b given separately
{
for (j=0; j<3; j++)
{














































int pointcolor = 0;
// initializing the carrier array




input = fopen(file,"r"); // file - is a global variable gets assigned in onload method
output = fopen(out,"w");
int xx = m_combox.GetCurSelO; int yy = m_comboy.GetCurSel();
int zz = m_comboz.GetCurSel();
// start reading from the assigned file in the OnLoad
fscanf (input,"%f%ffor/of%P/oft'AP/oWor/ofb/of%Wod", &coordaxis[0], &coordaxis[l],
&coordaxis[2], &coordaxis[3], &coordaxis[4], &coordaxis[5], &coordaxis[6],





// Output only the fields in the selected combo boxs
fprintf( output, "%ft%f\t%f\t%d\n", 	 coordaxis[xx] , coordaxis[yy] , coordaxis[zz] ,
pointcolor ) ;
// read the next line up in the data file
fscanf (input,"%ffor/of%r/oP/or/offor/ofb/or/d/or/od", &coordaxis[0], &coordaxis[l],
&coordaxis[2], &coordaxis[3], &coordaxis[4], &coordaxis[5], &coordaxis[6],
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